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Abstract
The paper studies the persistence of pro￿t and its determinants in emerging mar-
kets. We apply Markov chain analysis, dynamic panel GMM estimation, and quan-
tile regression techniques to a panel of approximately 3,000 Ukrainian companies.
The empirical results show a moderate level of pro￿t persistence, as well as a rel-
atively low speed of adjustment to the steady-state pro￿t level, thus providing no
support for the hypothesis that there is a lower persistence of pro￿ts in emerg-
ing markets due to more intense competition. Regarding the determinants of ￿rm
pro￿t in an emerging market economy, the ￿ndings from alternative methods re-
veal that ownership structure and regional location of the ￿rm have a signi￿cant
impact.
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A basic premise of economic theory is that company pro￿t rates should converge to
equality in competitive markets. Empirical studies, however, frequently ￿nd that di￿er-
ences in pro￿ts across ￿rms tend to persist over time. Moreover, there is considerable
variation across countries as to the speed with which ￿rm pro￿ts adjust (or reach) their
￿permanent￿ values (e.g., Cubbin and Geroski 1987, Waring 1996, Glen and Singh 2004).
These di￿erences could be due to the varying strength of anti-trust policies and country-
speci￿c regulatory systems (Geroski and Jacquemin 1988). One of the main conclusions
of the literature has been that rivalry alone does not erase persistent asymmetries among
￿rms.
The issue of the persistence of pro￿t has been intensively investigated for advanced
market economies, but the evidence for emerging market economies is rather scarce,
probably due to lack of appropriate micro data. A study of emerging markets by Glen
and Singh (2003) ￿nds that both short- and long-term persistence of pro￿tability are
lower in these markets compared to advanced markets. The authors conclude from this
￿nding that competition intensity is higher in emerging due to: (i) lower sunk cost
to enter markets, (ii) faster growth rates of ￿rms, (iii) weaker role of governmental
regulations, and (iv) the existence of many large business groups.
The aim of our study is to present further evidence on the persistence of pro￿t
in emerging markets by employing alternative methods in the empirical analysis. In
addition, we study the determinants of ￿rm pro￿t as it provides further interesting
insights into the di￿erences between emerging and advanced market economies. For
example, the process of ownership structure establishment in transition economies is
fundamentally di￿erent from that observed in more advanced economies. 1 In emerging
economies, strong ownership concentration negatively a￿ects ￿rm performance as do
underdeveloped capital markets.2 Accordingly, we provide evidence on the determinants
of pro￿t related to the speci￿cities of transition economies. In particular, we study the
1See Pivovarsky (2001).
2Poorly functioning credit markets may constrain the expansion of companies (Tybout 2000).
1role of ￿rms’ intangible assets, companies’ ownership structure, and ￿rm location play
in regard to pro￿tability.
In the empirical analysis we employ three di￿erent, but complementary, methods.
First, in a novel approach, we use Markov chain analysis for studying the persistence of
pro￿t because persistence can be de￿ned as the probability of remaining in the initial
pro￿t class. The Markov chain approach has the further advantage of allowing us to
investigate the mobility of ￿rms across di￿erent pro￿t classes, i.e., their likelihood of
switching pro￿t classes. Second, we apply dynamic panel data analysis to assess the
speed of adjustment of ￿rm pro￿t. Finally, to study the determinants of pro￿ts in
emerging markets we use quantile regression techniques, which provide more valuable
insights in this context than does the standard linear regression model. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature review. Section 3
describes our data. In Section 4, the empirical analysis is performed using the Markov
chain approach, dynamic panel data estimation, and quantile regressions. Section 5 sets
out our conclusions.
2 Literature Review
Numerous studies present evidence that the average ￿rm’s pro￿t comprises both per-
manent and short-run components, and that short-run shocks converge over time (see,
e.g., Mueller 1986). Earlier studies have estimated one rate of persistence of prof-
itability for all ￿rms. To avoid misleading results, Waring (1996) proposes considering a
￿rm’s pro￿tability as a combination of a competitive return component, an industry rent
component common to all ￿rms in the industry, and a ￿rm-speci￿c rent component. 3
The traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm is challenged by more re-
cent research that distinguishes between industry- and ￿rm-speci￿c e￿ects. 4 McGahan
(1999) ￿nds that both ￿rm and industry in￿uences are important, stating that (i) organi-
3Mueller (1977) argues that ￿rm pro￿t is comprised of a competitive return, a permanent rent
component, and a transitory rent component.
4The structure-conduct-performance paradigm postulates that certain market attributes, such as
market concentration or barriers to entry, in￿uence ￿rm behavior and determine pro￿tability.
2zational studies are essential for understanding performance di￿erences in a cross-section
analysis and (ii) industry studies allow for understanding performance over time. Mc-
Gahan (1999) also demonstrates that the industry e￿ects are more predictable for U.S.
corporations and have a large permanent component.
The industry view points out the importance of industry-speci￿c indicators, such as
market structure, ￿rm concentration, and capital intensity, for explaining pro￿t dispari-
ties and persistence. The results of Cubbin and Geroski (1987) suggest that considerable
heterogeneities exist within most industries. These authors also ￿nd that ￿rms in highly
concentrated industries adjust much more slowly toward long-run equilibrium pro￿t
rates. Caves and Porter (1977) argue that industry structure has a strong in￿uence
on the persistence of ￿rm-speci￿c rents. Some industries have structural characteristics
that impede entry and limit rivalry among companies.
The ￿rm persistency view stresses the role of ￿rm characteristics: size, market share,
growth, advertising, research and development expenditures, and so forth. Mueller
(1990) concludes that entry barriers can be maintained only by sustained innovation.
Thus, under the ￿pro￿t persistence￿ theory, it is innovation competition, not price com-
petition, that leads to persistent pro￿ts. The results of Ce￿s (1998) con￿rm that ￿rms
that are persistent innovators and earn above-average pro￿ts have a high propensity to
continue doing both, that is, they continue to innovate and earn above-average pro￿t.
However, extra pro￿t due to innovations can be only temporary, vanishing when competi-
tors start to imitate the products or processes of the innovative leading ￿rm. Moreover,
Galbreath and Galvin (2008) note that even existing competition can quickly diminish
extra returns gained from tangible resources. At the same time, intangible assets are
argued to support competitive advantages due to so-called isolating mechanisms that
act as barriers to replication of abnormal performance. 5
Empirical studies frequently demonstrate that a ￿rm’s pro￿t rate tends to converge
toward its long-run steady state, but that this equilibrium di￿ers across ￿rms, sectors,
and countries. Indeed, there is signi￿cant variability in the speed with which pro￿ts
5McGahan and Porter (1999) argue that industry structure hinders the imitation of pro￿table ￿rm
attributes by rivals and new entrants.
3adjustment to their ￿rm-speci￿c ￿permanent￿ value across di￿erent countries. Singh
(2003) points out that there are a number of factors in emerging countries that may
discourage competition (government-created barriers to entry, segmented markets, etc.).
At the same time, however, some structural peculiarities of transition economies make
it possible to encourage and intensify competition (lower sunk costs, special role of
large conglomerate companies operating in di￿erent industries, etc.). Because of these
paradoxical possibilities, Glen and Singh (2003) stress that the persistency results for de-
veloping countries need very prudent interpretation. They test pro￿tability persistence
￿in seven leading developing countries￿ (Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
and Zimbabwe), and conclude that both short- and long-term persistency of corporate
pro￿t rates for these seven countries are lower than those for mature economies. This is
an unexpected result in that it implies there is a higher level of competition in emerging
markets. However, none of the countries examined by Glen and Singh (2003) had expe-
rienced a planning economy. Therefore, our study makes a special contribution to this
issue as it examines pro￿t persistence in case of an ex-planning economy.
3 Data
The main data source is the SMIDA (State Commission on Securities and Stock Mar-
ket) database, which is comprised of the balance sheets and income statements of open
joint stock Ukrainian companies during 1999￿2006. Only economically active ￿rms (i.e.,
companies with positive sales values) are considered. Our data contain about 30,000
yearly ￿rm observations from around 5,000 ￿rms per year. Combining information on
performance and ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, we end up with a panel of approximately
3,000 ￿rms.6
We include the following factors for explaining pro￿ts: year, industry, and ￿rm loca-
tion dummy variables. Time dummies are included so as to capture business cycles. We
adopt the regional division of Ukraine into six economic regions for specifying regional
6The reliability of estimated transition probabilities in Markov chain analysis requires a su￿ciently
large number of observations.
4dummy variables indicating the regional location of ￿rms. Two-digit industry classi￿-
cation codes are used for specifying industry dummy variables. 7 The data allows us to
distinguish three levels of diversi￿cation. 8 We de￿ne a variable Divers that describes
the number of business ￿elds in which a company is engaged. This variable takes the
value of 0 for companies that specialize in just one area, the value of 1 when a ￿rm
operates in two industries, and if more than two industry codes are reported, Divers
takes a value of 2. We also de￿ne two variables to capture the in￿uence of ownership.
The ￿rst variable, Owncon, measures ownership concentration and is given a value of
0 when a ￿rm has a diluted ownership structure; if a person or another ￿rm owns a
signi￿cant proportion of the company’s shares (more than 25 percent), it takes the value
of 1. However, since di￿erent types of stakeholders might have a di￿erent impact on
the ￿rm, we use the variable Owner to indicate whether the owner is a corporation or
an individual (it takes value of 0 or 1, respectively). The list of additional ￿rm-speci￿c
applicable characteristics includes the size of company, the ￿rm’s leverage and liquidity,
and the ￿rm’s intangible assets.
We use two measures of pro￿t rate in the analyses: price-cost margin (PCM), which is
de￿ned as revenue minus costs relative to revenue, and return on assets (ROA), which is
de￿ned as operating pro￿ts divided by the assets of the ￿rm. As can be seen from Table
2, ￿rms from highly concentrated industries (e.g., Mining, Metallurgy, and Energy) tend
to have a higher average level of PCM but much lower ROA. Interestingly, these same
industries also have characteristics that impede entry or limit rivalry among members.
Furthermore, ￿rms from these industries are commonly heavily subsidized in Ukraine.
Due to anticipated problems with misreporting of company pro￿t, we prefer to use
both measures of pro￿t in the analysis. As ￿rms are likely to report downward-biased
values of their pro￿t, ROA may be a more inaccurate measure of pro￿t in an emerging
economy compared to an advanced one. The price-cost margin is likely to be a more
7The CCEA (Classi￿cation of the Categories of Economic Activity).
8Van Phu et al. (2004) investigate the performance of German ￿rms in the business-related service
sector. They conclude that age and the degree of diversi￿cation have a negative impact on ￿rm per-
formance; additionally, credit relations with several banks allow ￿rms with declining sales to improve
their situation.
5reliable measure for tracking the real performance trends. Hence, in our analysis we use
price-cost margin as the key variable.
Table 3 contains some descriptive statistics. Price-cost margin has a mean of about
0.288 during the observed period. The negative value of average ROA (￿0.009) demon-
strates the tendency of companies to report losses, although the large variation of this
variable (0.244) shows a wide range of extremely polar values. The natural logarithm of
sales is used as a proxy variable for ￿rm size. We deliberately decided not to use number
of employees as a measure of ￿rm size as there is ample evidence about the frequently
informal status of workers in transition economies. 9 Leverage and liquidity are related
to the debt literature of capital structure and re￿ect the ￿nancing opportunities of ￿rms
(Stephan et al. 2008). Mean leverage is about 34.5 percent of total liabilities. Liquidity
is de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. This variable indicates that
there is a considerable range of heterogeneity in regard to companies’ cash constraints.
The IntangibleAssets variable is used to proxy goodwill, which is expected to have a
great deal of in￿uence on ￿rm performance. According to accounting standards, ￿intan-
gible assets￿ include the value of patents, licenses, copyrights, and so forth. The mean
of the intangible assets in total assets is only 0.007 for our sample, but the standard
deviation (0.035) reveals notable variation of this variable across ￿rms.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Persistence of Pro￿t
4.1.1 Markov Chain Approach
Pro￿t persistence studies are typically based on estimation of ￿rst-order or second-order
autoregressive equations for ￿rm pro￿tability. Tauchen (1986) suggests a discrete-value
Markov chain analysis as an alternative procedure to approximate a continuous-valued
autoregression. Quah (1993) applies the Markov chain method using transition probabil-
9See, for instance Kupets (2006).
6ities matrices to investigate how income levels converge across di￿erent countries. 10 We
use the Markov chain approach in our analysis to explore the convergence and mobility
of Ukrainian ￿rm pro￿t rates.
Let yt
s denote the pro￿t rate of ￿rm s at time t. A discrete-time Markov chain process
requires that the following relation
Pfyt+1
s = jjyt
s = ig = pij
hold for the sequence fy0
s;y1
s:::g, meaning that this is a stochastic process such that
the probability pij of a random variable y being in the state j at any point of time t+1
depends only on the state i it has been in at point of time i. In other words, future
developments during any transition period t to t+1 depend only on the value in t. Thus,
the transition among classes can be described as:
F
t+1
y = P  F
t
y; (1)
where Fy denotes the ￿rm pro￿tability distribution at time t and t + 1, respectively.
The discrete-time Markov chains allow tracing the development of ￿rm behavior over
time and examining intra-distribution mobility as well as persistence of ￿rm pro￿tability.
Under this approach, transition probability matrices can be estimated, which provide
useful information regarding persistence as they describe the probability that a ￿rm
switches from one pro￿t class to another. To obtain valid estimates and reasonable
transition probabilities, two important prerequisites must be met: (i) time invariance
of the data-generating process and (ii) a su￿ciently large number of observations. The
latter imposes additional requirement on the formation of optimal bandwidth. Taking
into account the structure of our data, it is reasonable to de￿ne ￿ve, equally sized groups
so as to meet the requirements of the Markov process: (1) the least pro￿table ￿rms; (2)
low pro￿table ￿rms; (3) pro￿table ￿rms; (4) high pro￿table ￿rms; and (5) the most
pro￿table ￿rms. Accordingly, the ￿rst and second groups comprise companies with low
10A similar technique is developed in Quah (1996), Bickenbach and Bode (2003), Ce￿s (2003) and
Geppert and Stephan (2008).
7pro￿t rates, while the fourth and the ￿fth classes are ￿rms that have above-average
pro￿t.
The transition probability matrices are estimated using the sample of ￿rms for yearly
transition periods (Tables 4 and 5 for PCM and ROA, respectively). In the case of strong
pro￿t persistency, all elements on the main diagonal should be close to 1. Thus, since the
elements on the diagonal have values above 0.2, the results show a moderate persistence
of pro￿ts. However, we ￿nd a stronger persistence in the low and high pro￿t classes,
where the transition probability is around 0.4 (Bickenbach and Bode 2003).
The so-called half-life coe￿cient is a useful tool for evaluating the mobility of ￿rms
across pro￿t classes (Shorrocks 1978). The half-life coe￿cients suggest the speed of
convergence toward the equilibrium distribution for a Markov chain with transition
matrix P.11 In our case, the half-life coe￿cients imply a relatively quick convergence:
the equilibrium state will be achieved after two years.
It is useful to compare these results with predicted outcomes/probabilities condi-
tioned on the determinants of pro￿t. To this end, multinomial logit regressions are
employed despite the ordinal scale of our dependent variable. 12 The reason for em-
ploying this technique is to obtain the predicted transition probabilities of inter-group
movements (Tables 4 and 5 for PCM and ROA, respectively). The results corroborate
the prior conclusions as the elements of the new transition matrix gather along the main
diagonal. However, conditioned outcomes show a considerably higher level of persistence
and a longer time of convergence for both measures of pro￿tability (about ￿ve years for
PCM and about three and half years for ROA). Taken together, our ￿ndings of a mod-
erate level of persistence and a slow speed of adjustment to the steady-state value are
in contrast to those of Glen and Singh (2003).
11Half-life measure: h =
 log(2)
logj2j , where 2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix.
12The estimations of the multinomial regressions are available upon request.
84.1.2 Speed of Convergence: Robustness Check
The issue of pro￿t persistence is usually analyzed as a time-series problem because in the
structural model pro￿t persistence is dominated by the impact of past pro￿ts (Goddard
and Wilson (1999)). The majority of relevant studies implement the following empirical
model:
it = i + ii;t 1 + uit (2)
where it is normalized to the industry average pro￿t of ￿rm i in a given period t,
i and i denote the parameter of the lagged dependent variable, and uit is i.i.d error
term.
Empirical research is chie￿y interested in the estimation of i, as it indicates the
speed of adjustment. If i is close to 1 it means that there is slow adjustment or, in
other words, a high persistence of pro￿t in successive periods. However, if i has a
value close to 0, it suggests that the pro￿t level in the previous period does not a￿ect
the pro￿t level in the current period, hence indicating the absence of pro￿t persistence.
Goddard and Wilson (1999) summarize the most prominent studies in this ￿eld (Table
1). Mueller (1990), for instance, using a sample of U.S. corporations, ￿nds that the speed
of adjustment is about 0.18 on average, which is a low value and thus can be viewed
as a deviation from the more usual trend. However, he states that the long-run pro￿t
rates di￿er signi￿cantly across ￿rms and that the deviation of their pro￿t above the
norm appears to be quite stable for a remarkably high share of the ￿rms (69 percent).
Comparing the outcomes across advanced countries, the main conclusion of Glen and
Singh (2003) is that the persistency of pro￿t rate for developing countries is lower than
that of companies in advanced countries.
To provide additional evidence on the persistence of pro￿t in emerging markets we
use the GMM-SYS estimation technique as an alternative to the commonly applied
regression methods in pro￿t persistence studies. The model is speci￿ed as:
it = i;t 1 + x
0
it + uit; i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;T (3)
9Table 1: Summary of pro￿t persistence studies
Author Country Sample Observation Lambda
period per ￿rm
Mueller (1990) US 1950-1972 23 0.183
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) UK 1947-1977 29 0.488
France 1965-1982 18 0.412
Germany 1961-1981 21 0.410
Cubbin and Geroski (1987) UK 1948-1977 30 0.482
Odagiri and Yamavaki (1990) Japan 1964-1982 19 0.465
Schohl (1990) Germany 1961-1981 21 0.509
Waring (1996) US 1970-1989 20 0.540
Glen and Singh (2003) Emerging 1980-1994 10 0.01-0.42
countries
Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999), except Glen and Singh (2003)
where xit is a vector of exogenous regressors, uit = i + it, i is a ￿xed-e￿ect, andit is
a random disturbance.
We include the variables described in the previous section to control for important
in￿uences on the pro￿t rate. The size of company, intangible assets, and liquidity are
presumably the most in￿uential determinants of pro￿tability of ￿rms in emerging mar-
kets. Ownership structure and regional dummies are expected to provide some further
evidence on the peculiarities of a transition economy. Moreover, each equation includes
the diversi￿cation, year, and industry dummy variables.
The econometric model is estimated using the two-step GMM￿SYSTEM dynamic
panel estimator, which is the preferred estimator in our case, as it, unlike the usual
GMM estimator, uses not only transformed equations but also combines transformed
equations with level equations (see Blundell and Bond (1998)). The models are esti-
mated using the orthogonal transformation to remove individual ￿rm e￿ects. To check
the validity of the instruments, we perform Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions,
which is asymptotically distributed as 2(k) where k denotes the number of overidenti-
fying restrictions. Note that the GMM estimates are valid only if it errors are serially
10uncorrelated. Therefore, we present the test statistics for ￿rst-order and second-order
serial correlation.13
Table 6 reports the estimated parameters of the determinants of pro￿tability mea-
sured by PCM and ROA. All estimated coe￿cients are in line with our predictions.
The main focus of our investigation is on the speed of pro￿t adjustment which can be
calculated from the estimated parameters on lagged pro￿t rates. The estimated i is
0.4146 and 0.6965 for ROA and PCM respectively (Table 6). These parameters enable
the calculation of the half-life measure, which can be used as a further robustness check.
We achieve results very similar to those obtained from the previous Markov chain tech-
nique. The implied time of convergence for PCM is a little bit longer (about six years)
compared to the Markov chain result, while the adjustment time for ROA varies between
the results for unconditional and conditional transition matrices of the Markov chain ap-
proach. Thus, the results of the dynamic panel data analysis regarding the persistence
and speed of adjustment of pro￿t do not agree with the results for emerging markets
reported in Glen and Singh (2003).
The estimation results furthermore suggest that regional e￿ects are important for ex-
plaining di￿erences in pro￿t rates (Table 6). Compared to ￿rms located in the reference
region (North-Center), ￿rms located in the other Ukrainian regions have a signi￿cantly
lower level of pro￿tability. This ￿nding is in accord with the results of Schnytzer and
Andreyeva (2002), who report a permanent better performance of companies located
in central regions of Ukraine. The estimation results for ownership structure support
the view that individual ownership is positively associated with performance in Ukraine
(Pivovarsky 2001). However, this appears to be true only for ROA, not for pro￿tability
in terms of PCM.
13We apply the Windmeijer (2005) ￿nite sample correction using the XTABOND2 module of the
STATA package. In case of GMM-SYS the matrix of instruments for all ￿rms estimation includes
(Profitability)t 2 to (Profitability)t 4, (Size)t 1 to (Size)t 3, (Intangible Assets)t 1 to (Intangible
Assets)t 3, and (Liquidity)t 1 to (Liquidity)t 3, and (Profitability)t 4, (Size)t 3, (Intangible
Assets)t 3, and (Liquidity)t 3. See help for XTABOND2 Roodman (2006) for matrix of instruments
selection.
114.2 Determinants of Firm Pro￿ts
To study the determinants of pro￿t in more detail, we perform quantile regression anal-
yses (Koenker and Hallock 2001). For our purposes, estimation of linear models by
quantile regressions is preferable over the usual regression methods for a number of
reasons. First, quantile regression results are characteristically robust to outliers and
heavy-tailed distributions (Buchinsky 1998). Second, the quantile regressions technique
avoids the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all
points of the conditional distribution. Avoiding this assumption allows us to capture
￿rm heterogeneity in that the slope parameters can vary at di￿erent quantiles of the dis-
tribution of the dependent variable. An additional reason for using quantile regression
methodology is if variables are skewed or not normally distributed. Note that the coe￿-
cients from quantile regression can be interpreted as a marginal change in regressand at
the certain quantile due to marginal change in particular regressor (Yasar et al. 2006).
Tables 7 and 10 report the results from the quantile regressions for PCM and ROA,
respectively. From these tables, we can observe, ￿rst, that the explanatory power of
the models is higher for both the least and the most pro￿table ￿rms. As expected, the
outcomes for ROA demonstrate a positive signi￿cant association between pro￿tability
and size, which is consistent with theory and also a plausible ￿nding for transition
countries in particular. Tybout (2000), for example, points out that due to particular
features of emerging markets, large ￿rms have some advantages: (i) policies favor larger
companies, while inhibiting growth among small ￿rms, (ii) as a rule, large-scale producers
are selected for special subsidies, (iii) banks view larger companies as relatively less risky
and cheaper to service, and thus these companies are given preferential access to credit,
(iv) protectionist trade policies are more likely to favor large ￿rms, (v) and capital-
intensive ￿rms can lobby the government more vigorously.
A signi￿cant positive e￿ect of ￿rm size on PCM is found only for lower quantiles.
The pro￿tability of ￿rms with average levels of PCM is not sensitive to ￿rm size, while
negative coe￿cients for size are obtained for their more pro￿table counterparts. This
implies that the size of less pro￿table ￿rms is of great importance for enhancing PCM.
12However, more pro￿table ￿rms try to reduce size so as to maintain a higher PCM. Ap-
parently, this issue is related to the e￿ective scale question, since the most pro￿table
companies do not bene￿t from large size in achieving extra PCM and they are inclined
to report higher levels of ROA. This issue is especially notable as large relatively unprof-
itable ￿rms have a much better chance of surviving compared to pro￿table but smaller
companies (Singh 2003).
Glen and Singh (2004) argue that emerging market companies have a higher level of
￿xed assets than their counterparts in advanced markets. This is an important state-
ment, since high pro￿t can be maintained only by sustained innovation (Mueller 1990).
However, Galbreath and Galvin (2008) emphasize that tangible assets cannot be the
source of permanent competitive advantage because they are observable factors and,
thus, can be easily imitated by rivals, and that it is only reputation, patents, and other
intangible assets that result in abnormal pro￿t. Therefore, it is interesting to look at
whether the share of intangible assets in the structure of total (or ￿xed assets) allows
￿rms to obtain higher pro￿t. Our results demonstrate that PCM is positively related to
intangible assets, while there is no e￿ect of this variable on ROA.
An interesting aspect of the pro￿t persistence issue is companies’ capability to smooth
cash-￿ow shocks. To estimate this e￿ect, we de￿ne the liquidity ratio, which character-
izes ￿rms’ cash constraints.14 Garner et al. (2002) note that volatility of cash ￿ows
in￿uences the market value of ￿rms. However, a positive and signi￿cant in￿uence is
obtained only at the 75 percent quantile for PCM.
Several studies stress the crucial impact of agency costs and related problems with
corporate governance that ensue from unresolved ownership relations in Ukraine. For
instance, Estrin and Rosevear (1999) argue that outsiders have no in￿uence on ￿rm
performance in Ukraine due to the underdeveloped capital markets and the dispersed
ownership structure. Schnytzer and Andreyeva (2002) ￿nd that ownership concentration
improves the performance of Ukrainian companies. In contrast to these studies, our
estimation provides evidence of a signi￿cant and robust negative impact of concentrated
14Konings et al. (2003) ￿nd a stronger persistence of soft budget constraints for ￿rms in less developed
countries.
13ownership on pro￿tability ratios despite poor protection of minority ownership rights
and weak capital markets. However, this can be explained by cross-shareholding that
leads to reallocation of ￿rm resources to optimize joint bene￿ts of companies within
the business group. Khanna and Palepu (2000) point out that a￿liated companies can
face a situation of misallocation of capital when the cash ￿ow generated by pro￿table
￿rms within the group is invested in unpro￿table ventures, even though this may not
be in interest of minor shareholders. Moreover, Baum et al. (2008) demonstrate that
Ukrainian banks with political a￿liations operate with an objective function di￿erent
from that of strict pro￿t maximization. The in￿uence of ownership structure on pro￿t
persistence is additionally examined by controlling for the type of main stakeholder. 15
As predicted, if the dominant shareholder is a private individual, there is better ￿rm
performance. The behavior of the most (least) pro￿table companies is totally di￿erent
from the main group of ￿rms in the case of PCM (ROA) as it is not sensitive to the
impact of ownership structure.
To gain a deeper insight into the processes a￿ecting the pro￿t rates, we run quan-
tile regressions for ￿rm-speci￿c averages (between-￿rm regressions)and for within-￿rm
transformed variables (within-￿rm regressions). The results for within-￿rm quantile re-
gressions are reported in8 and 11 for PCM and ROA, respectively. Tables 9 and 12
set out the outcomes for the between-￿rm quantile calculations, the most interesting
of which is the positive signi￿cant coe￿cients for liquidity, a ￿nding that con￿rms our
previous hypothesis. The signi￿cant inverse relation between ROA and intangible assets
for regressions based on within transformed variables is found for the ￿rms with the
lowest and the highest rates of pro￿ts. This result implies regardless of the fact that
these ￿rms have invested heavily in patents and licenses, they still perform poorly. Very
similar results were found by Coad and Rao (2008). Finally, it should be mentioned
that models based on ￿rm-speci￿c averages have more explanatory power and validate
the principal tendencies described above for both measures of pro￿t rate.
15In general, corporate owners are assumed to have lower cost of monitoring the ￿rm’s management
because of greater expertise. Garner et al. (2002) note that the market value of a company is sensitive
to the percentage of institutional ownership.
145 Conclusions
The aim of our paper is to provide evidence on the hypothesis put forward by Glen and
Singh (2003) that the persistence of pro￿t is lower in emerging markets compared to
advanced ones. We use a panel data set on balance sheets and income statements of
open joint stock Ukrainian companies during 1999￿2006 in our analysis. The outcomes of
the Markov chain analysis show evidence of a moderate or high level of pro￿t persistence
in Ukraine. This ￿nding holds for both measures of pro￿tability￿price-cost margin and
return on assets. Thus, our results cast doubt on Glen and Singh’s (2003) hypothesis
that competition is more intense in emerging markets compared to advanced economies.
To complement and further substantiate these ￿ndings, we use dynamic panel data
techniques, enabling us to evaluate the speed of pro￿t convergence in Ukraine. The
estimates vary between 0.415 and 0.697 for return on assets and price-cost margin,
respectively, implying a comparatively low speed (six years) of adjustment of pro￿ts to
their steady-state value. Overall, the ￿ndings for Ukranian ￿rms do not signi￿cantly
di￿er from results that have been found in other empirical studies for ￿rms in more
advanced economies, which is a surprising outcome of our study.
Regarding the determinants of pro￿t, one noteworthy result is the signi￿cant impact
of ownership structure and regional location of ￿rms. Firms located in the North-Center
of Ukraine have, c.p., a higher pro￿tability than ￿rms located in other regions. An
unexpected negative relationship between pro￿t and ownership concentration appears
to be related to the misallocation of ￿nancial resources within business groups (Khanna
and Palepu 2000) and to the e￿ect of di￿erent objective functions for pro￿t maximization
of Ukrainian ￿rms (Baum et al. 2008). However, the ownership concentration exerts a
direct in￿uence on pro￿t if the blocking share belongs to a private individual, a ￿nding
that is in agreement with Estrin and Wright (1999).
Taking into account ￿rm heterogeneity, it is worth noting the varying impact of
pro￿t determinants at the high and low ends of the pro￿t distribution. The results of
the quantile regressions indicate that cross-shareholding and agency issues play a role
for explaining pro￿t in emerging markets.
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19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Pro￿t Rates across Industries
PCM ROA
Industry N    
Mining 2,759 0.285 0.164 -0.005 0.124
Food 2,362 0.278 0.123 0.008 0.147
Textile 1,170 0.269 0.140 0.003 0.162
Wood Processing 518 0.288 0.144 0.012 0.112
Chemicals and Oil Chemicals 840 0.290 0.132 0.016 0.170
Consturction Materials 2,557 0.270 0.139 -0.008 0.098
Metallurgy 721 0.298 0.149 -0.007 0.077
Electronic Tools 675 0.287 0.148 0.009 0.111
Machinery 417 0.259 0.129 -0.010 0.120
Processing 2,012 0.287 0.145 -0.011 0.139
Energy 3,549 0.335 0.165 -0.013 0.153
Construction 2,124 0.252 0.149 -0.053 0.632
Transport 144 0.332 0.168 0.006 0.224
Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Return on
Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to assets ratio.
20Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
V ariable Formula N  
Price   Cost Margin
Sit Cit
Sit 19,848 0.288 0.150
Return on Assets
EBITit
TAit 19,848 -0.009 0.244
Size log(Sit) 19,848 8.039 2.035
Liquidity
CAit
CLit 19,848 4.433 50.972
Leverage
LTDit+STDit
TAit 19,848 0.345 0.360
Intangible Assets
IAit
TAit 19,848 0.007 0.035
Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Return on
Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to assets ratio. Size is measured by logarithm of sales. Liquidity
is de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total assets
ratio. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets.
21Table 4: Transition Probability Matrices: Result for PCM
Transition Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Pi
(1) 0.399 0.213 0.145 0.120 0.123 0.200
(2) 0.233 0.328 0.200 0.133 0.105 0.200
(3) 0.150 0.227 0.296 0.197 0.130 0.200
(4) 0.110 0.124 0.230 0.346 0.190 0.200
(5) 0.109 0.108 0.128 0.203 0.451 0.200
Pj 0.207 0.193 0.186 0.196 0.217 1.000
Transition Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Pi
(1) 0.555 0.262 0.080 0.081 0.022 0.200
(2) 0.231 0.431 0.216 0.106 0.016 0.200
(3) 0.104 0.269 0.342 0.211 0.075 0.200
(4) 0.033 0.104 0.265 0.423 0.176 0.200
(5) 0.037 0.050 0.091 0.213 0.609 0.200
Pj 0.207 0.193 0.186 0.196 0.217 1.000
Note:
Pi - initial probabilities.
Pj - destination probabilities.
 - unconditional probability.
 - conditional probability.
(1) the least pro￿table ￿rms; (2) low pro￿table ￿rms; (3) pro￿table ￿rms; (4) highly pro￿table ￿rms;
(5) the most pro￿table ￿rms.
22Table 5: Transition Probability Matrices: Result for ROA
Transition Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Pi
(1) 0.370 0.216 0.150 0.136 0.127 0.200
(2) 0.234 0.289 0.216 0.155 0.106 0.200
(3) 0.153 0.234 0.281 0.222 0.110 0.200
(4) 0.122 0.162 0.238 0.280 0.198 0.200
(5) 0.121 0.099 0.115 0.206 0.459 0.200
Pj 0.207 0.191 0.189 0.189 0.225 1.000
Transition Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Pi
(1) 0.500 0.222 0.103 0.091 0.083 0.200
(2) 0.252 0.362 0.201 0.115 0.070 0.200
(3) 0.126 0.223 0.348 0.233 0.070 0.200
(4) 0.067 0.128 0.271 0.359 0.175 0.200
(5) 0.057 0.049 0.066 0.213 0.615 0.200
Pj 0.207 0.191 0.189 0.189 0.225 1.000
Note:
Pi - initial probabilities.
Pj - destination probabilities.
 - unconditional probability.
 - conditional probability.
(1) the least pro￿table ￿rms; (2) low pro￿table ￿rms; (3) pro￿table ￿rms; (4) highly pro￿table ￿rms;
(5) the most pro￿table ￿rms.
23Table 6: Determinants of Pro￿t






























Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Return on
Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to total assets ratio. Size is measured by logarithm of sales.
Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets. Liquidity is de￿ned as the
current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total assets ratio. Owncon is a
dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership structure. Owner is a
dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Reference category for
regional e￿ects is North-Center. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Es-
timation using XTABOND2 module for STATA. ￿Sargan￿ is a Sargan￿Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions (2 value reported). ￿AR(k)￿ is the test for k-th order autoregression. * signi￿cant at 10%;
** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
24Table 7: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t
Dependent Variable: PCMit
PCM (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0130*** 0.0089*** 0.0011 -0.0086*** -0.0160***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Intangible Assetsit 0.0813** 0.0777* 0.0735** 0.0853* 0.0332
(0.0328) (0.0435) (0.0375) (0.0475) (0.1117)
Liquidityit 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003* 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Leverageit -0.0510*** -0.0566*** -0.0491*** -0.0290*** 0.0010
(0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0074) (0.0102)
Ownconit -0.0091** -0.0071* -0.0073* 0.0010 -0.0024
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0080)
Ownerit 0.0159*** 0.0129*** 0.0124*** 0.0076* 0.0064
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0043) (0.0079)
South   Center -0.0109* -0.0042 -0.0001 0.0064 -0.0044
(0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0092)
Northeast -0.0122** -0.0123*** -0.0084** -0.0041 -0.0097
(0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0094)
Southeast -0.0097* -0.0057 0.0027 0.0045 -0.0060
(0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0059)
West -0.0061** -0.0073** -0.0082** -0.0062* -0.0200*
(0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0106)
South -0.0155*** -0.0110*** -0.0042 0.0048 0.0262***
(0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0076)
pseudo   R2 0.0624 0.0359 0.0245 0.0269 0.0467
N 19,848
Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Size is measured
by logarithm of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets.
Liquidity is de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total
assets ratio. Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership
structure. Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Reference category for
regional e￿ects is North-Center. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
25Table 8: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t: Result for Within Transformed Variables
Dependent Variable: PCMit
PCM (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0083*** 0.0030** -0.0039*** -0.0093*** -0.0233***
(0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030)
Intangible Assetsit 0.0589 0.0033 -0.0488 -0.0628 -0.1583
(0.0990) (0.0530) (0.0403) (0.1007) (0.1618)
Liquidityit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Leverageit -0.0561*** -0.0521*** -0.0427*** -0.0323*** -0.0173
(0.0070) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0126)
Ownconit -0.0024 -0.0085** -0.0000 -0.0027 -0.0071
(0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0006) (0.0030) (0.0062)
Ownerit 0.0021 0.0019 0.0000 0.0033 0.0101**
(0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0050)
pseudo   R2 0.0079 0.0057 0.0065 0.0114 0.0192
N 19,848
Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Size is measured
by logarithm of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets.
Liquidity is de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total
assets ratio. Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership
structure. Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Standard errors are re-
ported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
26Table 9: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t: Result for Between Transformed Variables
Dependent Variable: PCMit
PCM (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0079*** 0.0065*** 0.0007 -0.0041*** -0.0113***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0014)
Intangible Assetsit 0.1100*** 0.1605*** 0.1247*** 0.1380*** 0.1298
(0.0253) (0.0317) (0.0355) (0.0417) (0.0996)
Liquidityit 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0004*** 0.0010**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Leverageit -0.0355*** -0.0476*** -0.0340*** -0.0283*** -0.0082
(0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0092)
Ownconit -0.0022 -0.0028 0.0006 -0.0022 0.0024
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Ownerit 0.0115*** 0.0105*** 0.0064*** 0.0036 -0.0013
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0046)
South   Center -0.0049 -0.0064** 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0081
(0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0054)
Northeast -0.0026 -0.0099*** -0.0090*** -0.0058* -0.0124***
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0037)
Southeast -0.0174*** -0.0063*** 0.0054** 0.0084** 0.0020
(0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0049)
West -0.0037 -0.0078** -0.0092*** -0.0059** -0.0230***
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0045)
South -0.0042 -0.0094*** -0.0097*** 0.0034 0.0194**
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0088)
pseudo   R2 0.0633 0.0474 0.0346 0.0450 0.0672
N 19,848
Note: Price-cost margin variable (PCM) is de￿ned as sales minus cost divided by sales. Size is measured
by logarithm of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets.
Liquidity is de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total
assets ratio. Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership
structure. Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Reference category for
regional e￿ects is North-Center. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
27Table 10: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t
Dependent Variable: ROAit
ROA (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0200*** 0.0171*** 0.0147*** 0.0177*** 0.0233***
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Intangible Assetsit 0.0085 -0.0103 0.0073 0.0144 0.0318
(0.0138) (0.0179) (0.0163) (0.0275) (0.0374)
Liquidityit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Leverageit -0.1991*** -0.1213*** -0.0602*** -0.0446*** -0.0326**
(0.0102) (0.0061) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0133)
Ownconit 0.0023 -0.0074*** -0.0115*** -0.0163*** -0.0236***
(0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0061)
Ownerit 0.0001 0.0085*** 0.0121*** 0.0183*** 0.0230***
(0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0049)
South   Center -0.0058 -0.0082*** -0.0048** -0.0063*** -0.0009
(0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0076)
Northeast -0.0093*** -0.0072*** -0.0020 -0.0052** -0.0071*
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0037)
Southeast -0.0108*** -0.0136*** -0.0112*** -0.0148*** -0.0246***
(0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0032)
West -0.0027 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0012 -0.0034
(0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0031)
South -0.0114** -0.0086*** -0.0047** -0.0040* 0.0047
(0.0045) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0068)
pseudo   R2 0.1519 0.1039 0.0759 0.0862 0.0957
N 19,848
Note: Return on Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to assets ratio. Size is measured by logarithm
of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets. Liquidity is
de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total assets ratio.
Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership structure.
Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Reference category for
regional e￿ects is North-Center. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
28Table 11: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t: Result for Within Transformed Variables
Dependent Variable: ROAit
ROA (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0327*** 0.0281*** 0.0226*** 0.0251*** 0.0270***
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0022)
Intangible Assetsit -0.1811** -0.0435 -0.0077 -0.0122 -0.1343*
(0.0808) (0.0365) (0.0232) (0.0280) (0.0728)
Liquidityit 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Leverageit -0.1920*** -0.1463*** -0.1233*** -0.1357*** -0.1690***
(0.0185) (0.0125) (0.0079) (0.0101) (0.0142)
Ownconit -0.0000 -0.0020 0.0020* 0.0027* -0.0001
(0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0046)
Ownerit -0.0030 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0016 0.0022
(0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0033)
pseudo   R2 0.0680 0.0554 0.0465 0.0510 0.0527
N 19,848
Note: Return on Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to assets ratio. Size is measured by logarithm
of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets. Liquidity is
de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total assets ratio.
Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership structure.
Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Standard errors are re-
ported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
29Table 12: Determinants of Corporate Pro￿t: Result for Between Transformed Variables
Dependent Variable: ROAit
ROA (q10) (q25) (q50) (q75) (q90)
Sizeit 0.0190*** 0.0158*** 0.0153*** 0.0185*** 0.0219***
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Intangible Assetsit 0.0110 -0.0297*** -0.0098 -0.0284 0.1026***
(0.0156) (0.0101) (0.0157) (0.0285) (0.0272)
Liquidityit 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Leverageit -0.1344*** -0.0908*** -0.0632*** -0.0524*** -0.0368***
(0.0051) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0076)
Ownconit -0.0039 -0.0053*** -0.0088*** -0.0147*** -0.0247***
(0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0034)
Ownerit 0.0090*** 0.0079*** 0.0105*** 0.0138*** 0.0179***
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0026)
South   Center -0.0076*** -0.0080*** -0.0027 -0.0055*** -0.0043
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0036)
Northeast -0.0055* -0.0042*** -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0152***
(0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0036)
Southeast -0.0139*** -0.0111*** -0.0127*** -0.0169*** -0.0249***
(0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0036)
West -0.0052* -0.0035** 0.0007 0.0023 -0.0079***
(0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0029)
South -0.0117*** -0.0113*** -0.0051*** -0.0021 -0.0064**
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0029)
pseudo   R2 0.1714 0.1418 0.1183 0.1268 0.1423
N 19,848
Note: Return on Assets (ROA) is constructed as EBIT to assets ratio. Size is measured by logarithm
of sales. Intangible Assets is calculated as a share of intangible assets in total assets. Liquidity is
de￿ned as the current assets to current liabilities ratio. Leverage is the ￿rm’s debt to total assets ratio.
Owncon is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the ￿rm has concentrated ownership structure.
Owner is a dummy variable which equals one if dominant shareholder is an individual.
Each equation includes year, industry, and diversi￿cation dummy variables. Reference category for
regional e￿ects is North-Center. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
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